As Thomas Nagel uses the term in his

article of the same name, a person is subject to

moral luck whenever he or she is still treated as a

candidate for praise or blame even though the action

in question depended in some significant

way on factors outside of his or her control. Nagel

identifies four types of moral luck: constitutive

luck, luck in one’s circumstances, luck in the consequences

of one’s actions, and luck in the antecedents

of one’s actions. When we act, our

actions are thoroughly situated in a context that

includes the sort of person that we are (our constitution),

the circumstances in which we find

ourselves, the events that led up to our actions,

and the events that will follow from whatever we

do. To the extent that we lack control over any of

these aspects of the context and yet are still

treated as candidates for praise and blame, we are

to that extent subject to moral luck.