The term analytical philosophy

is often used for a style of doing philosophy

that was dominant throughout most of the twentieth

century in Great Britain, North America,

Australia, and New Zealand. This way of doing

philosophy puts great emphasis on clarity, and it

usually sees philosophy as a matter of clarifying

important concepts in the sciences, the humanities,

politics, and everyday life, rather than providing

an independent source of knowledge.

Analytical philosophy is often contrasted with

continental philosophy, the sort of philosophy that

has been more dominant in France, Germany,

Spain, Italy, and some other European countries.

The term was first associated with the movement

initiated by Bertrand Russell and G. E.

Moore early in the twentieth century to reject the

idealistic philosophy of F. H. Bradley, which had

been influenced by the German idealism of Hegel

and others. Moore saw philosophy as the analysis of concepts. Analytical philosophy grew out of the

approach and concerns of Moore and Russell,

combined with the logical positivist movement

and certain elements of pragmatism in America.

However, the term analytical philosophy now

refers to many philosophers who do not subscribe

to the exact conceptions of philosophy held by the

analysts, logical positivists, or pragmatists.

Indeed, there are really no precise conceptual

or geographic boundaries separating analytical

and continental philosophy. There are many

analytical philosophers on the continent of

Europe and many who identify themselves

with continental philosophy in English-speaking

countries. And there are important subgroups

within each group. Within analytical philosophy,

some philosophers take logic as their model, and

others emphasize ordinary language. Both analytical

and continental philosophers draw inspiration

from the great philosophers of history,

from the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle to

Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Frege, Husserl,

James, and Dewey